We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with … relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize optimal relational contracts and competitive screening policies which are … interdependent. When non-contractible dimensions are important, the principal optimally restricts competitive screening to a subset …

economic function: through project screening they can reduce the number of project failures and thus mitigate their private and … market equilibria in which cheap credit is inappropriately emphasized over project screening. Restrictions on collateral …

We examine the role of security design when lenders make inefficient accept-or-reject decisions after screening … to the screening outcome: borrowers are either accepted, in which case they all obtain the same loan terms, or rejected. …

We study the optimal allocation of screening tasks between two agents (incumbent vs. outsider or senior vs. junior … the screening procedure to the incumbent. In general, the information disclosed by the screening tasks and the turnover …

undertake their screening decisions in an uncoordinated way, thereby highlighting the role of intertemporal screening … externalities induced by lending market competition as a structural source of instability. We show that uncoordinated screening … fluctuations inducing business cycles. The screening cycle mechanism is robust to generalizations along many dimensions such as the …

, banks compete to finance an investment project with uncertain return. By screening the firm a bank learns about its … profitability. Surprisingly, it is found that an increase in bank competition need not reduce a bank's screening incentive even …

-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of …