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Cultural Inertia and Uniformity in Organizations

Carrillo, Juan D; Gromb, Denis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We analyse aspects of the structure of organizational culture. We show that old and culturally uniform organizations are prone to cultural inertia; that is they are reluctant to adopt a different culture in response to a change in the environment. Cultural uniformity can be beneficial because the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498015

Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083449

Loan Sales and Screening Incentives

Bester, Helmut; Gehrig, Thomas; Stenbacka, Rune - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We analyze the effect of loan sales on the intensity of costly screening. Loan sales strengthen screening incentives … when screening primarily improves the bank’s ability to identify profitable loans and when banks retain most of those … profitable loans. However, loan sales dampen screening incentives when the benefit of screening primarily helps to weed out …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083726

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information

Garrett, Daniel; Gomes, Renato; Maestri, Lucas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study competition in price-quality menus when consumers privately know their valuation for quality (type), and are heterogeneously informed about the offers available in the market. While firms are ex-ante identical, the menus offered in equilibrium are ordered so that more generous menus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084418

Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice, consumers can determine the precision of a privately observed signal that is informative about their accident risk. The equilibrium effort is, depending on parameter values, either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084544

Gender and Banking: Are Women Better Loan Officers?

Beck, Thorsten; Behr, Patrick; Güttler, Andre - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We analyze gender differences associated with loan officer performance. Using a unique data set for a commercial bank in Albania over the period 1996 to 2006, we find that loans screened and monitored by female loan officers show statistically and economically significant lower default rates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005048548

Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening

Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with … relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize optimal relational contracts and competitive screening policies which are … interdependent. When non-contractible dimensions are important, the principal optimally restricts competitive screening to a subset …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082534

Bank Competition and Enterprise restructuring in Transition Economies

Schnitzer, Monika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

We investigate how bank competition affects the efficiency of credit allocation, using a model of spatial competition. Our analysis shows that bad loans are more likely the larger the number of banks competing for customers. We study further how many banks will be active if market entry is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067568

Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets

Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother's gene than the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing an agent's gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent's or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661858