The paper examines the determinants of the division of labour within firms. It provides an explanation of the pervasive change in work organization away from the traditional functional departments and towards multi-tasking and job rotation. Whereas the existing literature on the division of...

This paper explores the implications of the ongoing reorganization of firms for inequality in the labour market. We show how recent technological advances in physical and human capital can lead to the breakdown of occupational barriers, creating demands for new combinations of skills, and...

The paper analyses the contemporary organizational restructuring of production and work and derives some salient implications for the labour market. The analysis focuses on the switch from occupational specialization at 'Tayloristic' organizations to multi-tasking at 'holistic' organizations....

Can we design statistical models to predict corporate earnings which either perform as well as, or even better than analysts? If we can, then we might consider automating the process, and notably apply it to small and international firms which typically have either sparse or no analyst coverage....

We study the effect of earnings manipulation on incentives within the corporate hierarchy. When top management manipulates earnings, it must prevent information leakage from corporate insiders to the outside world. If an insider (e.g. a division manager) gains evidence about earnings...

We study the effect of earnings manipulation on incentives within the corporate hierarchy. When top management manipulates earnings, it must prevent information leakage from corporate insiders to the outside world. If an insider (e.g. a division manager) gains evidence about earnings...

This paper examines how networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of the careers of executives of European and US companies. We build a dynamic model of career progression in which career moves both depend upon existing networks and contribute to the development of future...

We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting in which firms compete for CEOs. The optimal contracts are designed to retain and insure CEOs. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. We show that the...

The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone's hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest firms...