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International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain

Dequiedt, Vianney; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are imperfectly observed by firms in the host country and where information asymmetries are more severe for immigrants than for natives. There are two stages. In the first one, workers in the South decide whether to move and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144730

Loan Sales and Screening Incentives

Bester, Helmut; Gehrig, Thomas; Stenbacka, Rune - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We analyze the effect of loan sales on the intensity of costly screening. Loan sales strengthen screening incentives … when screening primarily improves the bank’s ability to identify profitable loans and when banks retain most of those … profitable loans. However, loan sales dampen screening incentives when the benefit of screening primarily helps to weed out …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083726

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information

Garrett, Daniel; Gomes, Renato; Maestri, Lucas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study competition in price-quality menus when consumers privately know their valuation for quality (type), and are heterogeneously informed about the offers available in the market. While firms are ex-ante identical, the menus offered in equilibrium are ordered so that more generous menus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084418

Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice, consumers can determine the precision of a privately observed signal that is informative about their accident risk. The equilibrium effort is, depending on parameter values, either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084544

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

Martin, Alberto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854521

Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083449

Durable Goods with Quality Differentiation

Inderst, Roman - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

What is the optimal strategy of a durable-goods monopolist that can offer goods in different qualities? This Paper provides an answer for the case where the market is segmented into low- and high-income buyers. If the monopolist can change their product and price policy sufficiently rapidly -...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789022

Try Me! On Job Assignments as a Screening Device

Carrillo, Juan D - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We study the optimal allocation of screening tasks between two agents (incumbent vs. outsider or senior vs. junior … the screening procedure to the incumbent. In general, the information disclosed by the screening tasks and the turnover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789059

Does Education Raise Productivity or Just Reflect It?

Chevalier, Arnaud; Harmon, Colm; Walker, Ian; Zhu, Yu - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

It is clear that education has an important effect on wages paid in the labour market. It is not clear, however, whether this is due to the role that education plays in raising the productivity of workers (the human capital explanation) or whether education simply reflects the ability of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791987