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Distributional Conflict in Organisations
Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M; Wärneryd, Karl - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
Hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations. Contrary … single-tier organizations, even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be … influenced. These benefits derive from two effects. First, part of the conflict in multi-divisional organizations takes place on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504716
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Who is the Enemy?
Epstein, Gil S; Gang, Ira - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251
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Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124335
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When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia
Chacón, Mario; Robinson, James A; Torvik, Ragnar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656168
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Multi-Battle Contests
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791548
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Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War
Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation … why. Compared to a single stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipated among the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661937
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Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans
Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action … in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134
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Democracy and Foreign Education
Spilimbergo, Antonio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Do foreign educated individuals play a role in promoting democracy in their home country? Despite the large amount of private and public resources spent on foreign education, there is no systematic evidence that foreign educated individuals foster democracy in their home countries. Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791894
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How Do Politicians Save? Buffer Stock Management of Unemployment Insurance Finance
Craig, Steven G.; Hemissi, Wided; Mukherjee, Satadru; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper successfully fits a model of forward looking government savings behavior to data from the U.S. state Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs 1976-2008. Specifically, we find states do not perfectly smooth tax rates in Barro's sense, but follow behavior consistent with a buffer stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083923
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Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War
Glick, Reuven; Taylor, Alan M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
Conventional wisdom in economic history suggests that conflict between countries can be enormously disruptive of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504411