We examine the relationship between the employment and compensation of managers and CEOs and the presence of a … monitoring, which requires more managers. The model also assumes rent sharing between workers, managers and the owners of the … firm. Unions, by redistributing rents towards the workers, lead to lower employment and lower pay for managers. Using a …

, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage … constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

In many instances, 'independently-minded' top-ranking executives can impose strong discipline on their CEO, even though … before the current CEO was appointed. In a very robust way, firms with a smaller fraction of independent executives exhibit … governance are more efficiently run. We empirically label as 'independent from the CEO' a top executive who joined the firm …

control for a wide range of CEO, firm and industry characteristics. The differences in hours worked between family and …

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle …-tradable or illiquid assets. The insider with trade-information is one of the fund managers. We find that front-running activity …

. Under the alternative rent extraction view that we examine, the board does not operate at arm’s length; rather, executives … have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid …