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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of … compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who distorts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium

Drugov, Mikhail - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

complements this pattern is reinforced while under competition in substitutes the principals trade off the benefits of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083946

Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information

Garrett, Daniel; Gomes, Renato; Maestri, Lucas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study competition in price-quality menus when consumers privately know their valuation for quality (type), and are … intensity, from perfect competition to monopoly. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084418

Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection

Kosfeld, Michael; Von Siemens, Ferdinand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team’s performance and therefore on their colleagues’ productivity. We study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084476

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

crucial novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. The quality of investment … distribute themselves across all offered contracts. Competition between banks introduces three possibilities for a breakdown of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861

Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure

Aney, Madhav; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246601

A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644035

Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468554

Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection

Philippon, Thomas; Skreta, Vasiliki - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We study interventions to restore efficient lending and investment when financial markets fail because of adverse selection. We solve a design problem where the decision to participate in a program offered by the government can be a signal for private information. We charac terize optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468692

Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion

Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654

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