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Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation
Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Otamendi, F. Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145460
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Innovation, Competition, and Investment Timing
Koskinen, Yrjö; Mæland, Jøril - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and when to invest in it. Innovators have to provide costly effort and they learn privately the cost of investing. Multiple efforts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084370
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How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?
Cornelli, Francesca; Felli, Leonardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails its sale. This Paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by retaining the minority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791603
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Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms
Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms …. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792072
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On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
buying one unit. The sellers simultaneously set reserve prices and use second price auctions as rationing device. An … demonstrate that not allowing sellers to use second price auctions may enhance total surplus. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662147
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On Seller Estimates and Buyer Returns
Gershkov, Alex; Toxvaerd, Flavio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666660
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Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096108
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Should Auctions Be Transparent?
Bergemann, Dirk; Hörner, Johannes - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611021
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Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media
Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We develop a model with many advertisers (products) and many advertising markets (media). Each advertiser sells to a different segment of consumers, and each medium has a different ability to target advertising messages. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in the media markets and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008607505
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Information Acquisition During a Descending Auction
Wambach, Achim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504666