This Paper explores the effects of a menu of inter-generational fiscal policies (public debt financed by taxes, PAYG social security system and inheritance taxation) in an overlapping generations model with perfect altruism. It generalizes the model by Barro (1974) by introducing...

This paper sets a framework for analysing how memoryless voters may come to elect and re-elect a committed policy-maker. Policy-makers, we assume, are trusted to implement the policy that they announce ex ante (and do implement it, if elected and re-elected). Voters, however, are never bound by...

The dynamic inconsistency of a government's preferred policy, when it occurs, usually implies that the maximum level of welfare that can be delivered at some initial time can only be attained by constraining the economy to `low' levels in the future. In this paper, we set up a linear quadratic...

The European Monetary System (EMS) has proven to work remarkably well thus far, despite three major realignments. We make an attempt to explain the dynamic stability of the system. This attempt gives a central place to movements in desired transactions balances, or `leads and lags', as they are...

It has been recognized that the optimal strategy of a government is generally time-inconsistent: optimality requires that the government take into account expectations effects in the formulation of its policy and to ignore these effects when applying the policy. In order to analyse the problem,...

In this paper we use data on five social inclusion indicators (poverty, inequality, unemployment, education and health) to assess and compare the performance of 27 European welfare states (EU27) in 2008. Aggregate measures of performance are obtained using index number methods similar to those...

We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk...

This Paper starts from the result of Rochet (1989), that with distortionary income taxes social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under...

This paper studies the design of pension schemes in a society where fertility is endogenous and parents differ in their ability to raise children. In a world with perfect information, a pay-as-you-go social security system is characterized by equal pensions for all but different contributions...

In many countries pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e., an individual’s benefits are reduced if he has labour income. This paper examines whether or not such earning tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with...