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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

CEO Compensation and Strategy Inertia

Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper considers the joint optimal design of CEOs' on-the-job compensation and severance pay in a general optimal contracting framework. We obtain a novel argument for high-powered, non-linear CEO compensation such as bonus schemes and option grants that is different from existing arguments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791544

Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment

Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study a model in which a CEO can entrench himself by hiding information from the board that would allow the board to conclude that he should be replaced. Assuming that even diligent monitoring by the board cannot fully overcome the information asymmetry vis-à-vis the CEO, we ask if there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124079

Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives

Benmelech, Efraim; Kandel, Eugene; Veronesi, Pietro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm’s investment opportunities by following largely … overvalued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124453

Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498010

CEO Power, Compensation and Governance

Albuquerque, Rui; Miao, Jianjun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favour one or the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656247

Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272716

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

The Old Boy Network: Gender Differences in the Impact of Social Networks on Remuneration in Top Executive Jobs

Lalanne, Marie; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Using an original dataset describing the career history of some 16,000 senior executives and members of the non-executive board of US, UK, French and German companies, we investigate gender differences in the use of social networks and their impact on earnings. There is a large gender wage gap:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009351518