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Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement

Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper examines optimal incentives and performance measurement in a setting where an agent has specific knowledge about the consequences of their actions for the principal. I study incentive contracts in which the agent’s compensation can be based on both ‘input’ measures closely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504471

Performance Measurement with Loss Aversion

Gemmill, Gordon T; Hwang, Soosung; Salmon, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We examine a simple measure of portfolio performance based on prospect theory, which captures not only risk and return but also reflects differential aversion to upside and downside risk. The measure we propose is a ratio of gains to losses, with the gains and losses weighted (if desired) to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114253

A General Test of Gaming

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behaviour is typically hidden from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114434

Privatization and Quality: Evidence from Elderly Care in Sweden

Bergman, Mats; Johansson, Per; Lundberg, Sofia; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084097

Performance Measurement using Multiple Asset Class Portfolio Data

Blake, David; Lehmann, Bruce N; Timmermann, Allan G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

to the strong incentive the fund managers had not to underperform relative to their peer group. For domestic equities, by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666475

Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives

Courty, Pascal; Kim, Do Han; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Using data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ‘shadow prices’ for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers’ intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666832

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946

Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey

Djankov, Simeon; Murrell, Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We survey the empirical literature analysing the process of enterprise restructuring in transition economies. The survey provides new insights into the relative effectiveness of different reform policies, and into how this effectiveness varies across regions. We study the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504282

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270