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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Bottom-Up Corporate Governance
Landier, Augustin; Sraer, David; Thesmar, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
In many instances, 'independently-minded' top-ranking executives can impose strong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority. This paper argues that the use of such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature of good corporate governance. We provide robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136453
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Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?
Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717
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The Internal Governance of Firms
Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207
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The Structure of Corporate ownership in Privatized Utilities
Trillas, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
concentration. When political objectives are added to the analysis, it is shown that lobbying with managers induces levels of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123598
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Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963
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Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland
Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379
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Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?
Cronqvist, Henrik; Heyman, Fredrik; Nilsson, Mattias; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
Analyzing a large panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers’ pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through ownership of cash flow rights mitigate such behaviour. These findings do not seem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067445
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Rhineland exit?
Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We argue in favour of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons, First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle between the stakeholders about the ultimate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504292