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Booth, Alison L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

This paper develops a simple model of employment, non-statutory redundancy pay and wage determination. An interesting feature of this model is that the contract curve is vertical. Some of the predictions of the model are confronted with the available British data on non-statutory firing costs,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791782

The Unemployment Implications of Mandatory Firing Costs

Booth, Alison L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

The model developed in this paper examines the relationship between firing costs and unemployment in a simple two-period model with uncertainty. Where there are long-term employment relationships, and where risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms bargain over wages and firing costs, average...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666736

Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination

Booth, Alison L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

Popular characterizations of union preferences assume that the income of laid-off union members is exogenous. There is evidence, however, of intra-union distribution schemes such as severance payments, unemployment insurance, retraining arrangements and early retirement schemes. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661618

Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk: Implications for Employment Contracts

Pissarides, Christopher - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk-averse and there are employment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises during employment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severance compensation to smooth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124282

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behaviour

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing … termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667065

Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives

Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388

Serial CEO Incentives and the Structure of Managerial Contracts

Giannetti, Mariassunta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper analyzes the optimal contracting consequences of a recent phenomenon in the managerial labour market, CEO job hopping. I show that if the managerial labour market is thin and firm growth opportunities are weak, the optimal contract rewards the CEO for past performance through a bonus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504521