Showing 1 - 10 of 277
Organizations fail due to incentive problems (agents do not want to act in the organization's interests) and bounded rationality problems (agents do not have the necessary information to do so). This survey uses recent advances in organizational economics to illuminate organizational failures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165668
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of … compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who distorts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554231
Analyzing data from a unique survey of managers of Chinese private firms, we investigate how family ties with firm … heads affect managerial compensation and job assignment. We find that family managers earn higher salaries and receive more … bonuses, hold higher positions, and are given more decision rights and job responsibilities than non-family managers in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468597
The informativeness principle demonstrates qualitative benefits to increasing signal precision. However, it is difficult to quantify these benefits -- and compare them against the costs of precision -- since we typically cannot solve for the optimal contract and analyze how it changes with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083624
result can rationalize the high pay differential between CEOs and divisional managers. An increase in the synergy between two … particular agents can lead to a third agent being endogenously excluded from the team, even if his own synergy is unchanged. This … result has implications for optimal team composition and firm boundaries. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083625
This paper shows that the informativeness principle, as originally formulated by Holmstrom (1979), does not hold if the first-order approach is invalid. We introduce a "generalized informativeness principle" that takes into account non-local incentive constraints and holds generically, even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096100
result can rationalize the high pay differential between CEOs and divisional managers. An increase in the synergy between two … particular agents can lead to a third agent being endogenously excluded from the team, even if his own synergy is unchanged. This … result has implications for optimal team composition and firm boundaries. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083428
This paper shows that the informativeness principle does not automatically extend to settings with limited liability. Even if a signal is informative about effort, it may have no value for contracting. An agent with limited liability is paid zero for certain output realizations. Thus, even if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083536
Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team-based incentives remains scarce …. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers’ effort and team … precise when the provision of team-based incentives crowds out the productivity enhancing effect of social connections under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083724