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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of … compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who distorts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium

Drugov, Mikhail - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

complements this pattern is reinforced while under competition in substitutes the principals trade off the benefits of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083946

Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information

Garrett, Daniel; Gomes, Renato; Maestri, Lucas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study competition in price-quality menus when consumers privately know their valuation for quality (type), and are … intensity, from perfect competition to monopoly. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084418

Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection

Kosfeld, Michael; Von Siemens, Ferdinand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team’s performance and therefore on their colleagues’ productivity. We study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084476

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

crucial novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. The quality of investment … distribute themselves across all offered contracts. Competition between banks introduces three possibilities for a breakdown of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861

Unemployment Insurance Design: Inducing Moving and Retraining

Hassler, John; Mora, Rodríguez; Vicente, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex-ante. The problem of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504238

Incomplete Wage Posting

Michelacci, Claudio; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We consider a competitive search model where firms with vacancies choose between posting a wage ex-ante and bargaining it with workers ex-post. Workers apply for vacancies after observing firms' wage setting decisions, and differ in some observable but not verifiable qualifications that affect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504658

Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497798

The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory

Carrillo, Juan D; Palfrey, Thomas R - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We analyze a game of two-sided private information characterized by extreme adverse selection, and study a special case in the laboratory. Each player has a privately known "strength" and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, there is a conflict; the stronger player...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497885

Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083449