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Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions

Brown, Martin; Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

attempts to appropriate the whole gains from trade, which causes much disagreement about contract terms. If contracts are … long side of the market so that there is little disagreement about contract terms. Our results support theories of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661770

The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector

Gagnepain, Philippe; Ivaldi, Marc; Martimort, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684689

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

lenders, which may make lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and … additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors, which is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract, only attractive for … seek to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861

Performance Pay and the Gender Wage Gap: Evidence from Spain

de la Rica, Sara; Dolado, Juan J.; Vegas, Raquel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper uses detailed information from a large wage survey in 2006 to analyze the gender wage gap in the performance-pay (PP) component of total hourly wages and its contribution to the overall gender gap in Spain. Under the assumption that PP is determined in a more competitive fashion than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554226

Returns to Inventors

Toivanen, Otto; Väänänen, Lotta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

A key input to inventive activity is human capital. Hence it is important to understand the monetary incentives of inventors. We estimate the effect of patented inventions on individual earnings by linking data on U.S. patents and their inventors to Finnish employer-employee data. Returns are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530342

Performance Pay and Adverse Selection

Moen, Espen R; Rosén, Åsa - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

It is well known in personnel economics that firms may improve the quality of their workforce by offering performance pay. We analyse an equilibrium model where worker productivity is private information and show that the gains to the firms from worker self-selection may not be matched by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123693

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Harnessing Success: Determinants of University Technology Licensing Performance

Belenzon, Sharon; Schankerman, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and government constraints on university licensing performance. We develop and test a simple contracting model of technology licensing offices, using new survey information together with panel data on U.S. universities for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667018

The Internal Governance of Firms

Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207

Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives

Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem, in an incomplete contracting model in which the agent can be rewarded based only on financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388