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Workers' Versus Bankers' Europe (II): Policy Externalities and Credibility in EMU
Bottazzi, Laura; Manasse, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
In this paper we analyse how the creation of a single currency regime changes the strategic relationship between policy-makers, both within and across countries. In particular we look at the role of cross-country externalities and lack of commitment. When labour taxation is excessive, due to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136411
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Convergence and Anchoring of Yield Curves in the Euro Area
Ehrmann, Michael; Fratzscher, Marcel; Gürkaynak, Refet S. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
the credibility that financial markets attach to monetary policy in the euro area. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067658
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Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy
Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
incentive constraints on the policy-making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and …, and focuses on credibility, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with … fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up; the main topics covered in this section are credibility of tax policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498016
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Capital Accumulation, Inflation and Long-Run Conflict in International Objectives
van der Ploeg, Frederick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986
-commitment. Coordination can be futile, since it exacerbates the lack of credibility perceived by the private sectors. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504714
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The Term Structure of Interest Rates, Structural Stability and Macroeconomic Policy Changes in the UK
Driffill, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1990
credibility in order to discover the period from 1959-87 using quarterly data. A stochastic regime switching model used by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281377
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The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective
Clarida, Richard; Galí, Jordi; Gertler, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
This paper reviews the recent literature on monetary policy rules. We exposit the monetary policy design problem within a simple baseline theoretical framework. We then consider the implications of adding various real world complications. Among other things, we show that the optimal policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666476
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Monetary Policy Issues in a Low Inflation Environment
Viñals, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
One of the most striking macroeconomic phenomena in recent decades has been the achievement of rather low and more stable rates of inflation in many countries. Consequently, the main goal of this Paper is to offer an overview of the main policy issues arising in a low inflation environment and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666924
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The Advantages of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility
Giavazzi, Francesco; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986
this question appropriately, one must consider that EMS membership brings potentially large credibility gains to policy … inefficiency stemming from the public's mistrust for the authorities. We study the conditions under which these credibility gains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791653
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Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem
Driffill, John; Rotondi, Zeno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
It has been argued that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the government, does not mitigate the problem of time-inconsistency, but merely relocates it. We argue here that this is not so, and that delegation enables a wider class of economies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656362
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Monetary Policy and Reputational Equilibria: A Resolution of the Non-Uniqueness Problem
Al-Nowaihi, A; Levine, Paul L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992
game. We introduce a `chisel-proof' credibility condition which ensures that in response to a small deviation from the low …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656437