Similar Search Results

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150196

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604557

Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002

We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents’ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102109

Informational size and two-stage mechanisms

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015

We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011193604

Inference of Bidders’ Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry, Second Version

Fang, Hanming; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011

auctions, auction theory predicts bid distributions in Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not convey any information about bidders … risk averse. We show bidders' expected profits from entry into auctions is nonparametrically recoverable, if a researcher …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010543520

Inference of Bidders’ Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry

Fang, Hanming; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

Bidders’ risk attitudes have key implications for choices of revenue-maximizing auction formats. In ascending auctions … transaction prices and participation decisions in ascending auctions with entry costs. Nonparametric tests are proposed for two … of risk attitudes in a more general model of ascending auctions with selective entry, where bidders receive entry …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699855