In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

-attribute auctions in which buyers take into account seller's price as well as various characteristics, including quality. Our …-attribute auctions as is common in public procurement. …

post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread …

game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of …