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Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - CESifo - 2004
. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765867
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Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus - CESifo - 2004
actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand … enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit … incentives weaken the enforcement power of implicit bonus incentives significantly. Our results are largely consistent with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406078
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Regional Implications of Financial Market Development: Credit Rationing, Trade, and Location
Ehrlich, Maximilian Von; Seidel, Tobias - CESifo - 2013
We develop a heterogeneous-firms model with trade in goods, labor mobility and credit constraints due to moral hazard. Mitigating financial frictions reduces the incentive of high-skilled workers to migrate to one region such that an unequal distribution of industrial activity becomes less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877832
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Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, Christian; Stahl, Konrad O. - CESifo - 2013
We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877941
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Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts
Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - CESifo - 2014
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker’s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877973
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The European Central Bank: Lender of Last Resort in the Government Bond Markets?
Grauwe, Paul De - CESifo - 2011
The sovereign debt crisis has made it clear that central banking is more than keeping inflation low. Central banks are also responsible for financial stability. An essential tool in maintaining financial stability is provided by the capacity of the central bank to be the lender of last resort in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294102
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Firms' Moral Hazard in Sickness Absences
Böheim, René; Leoni, Thomas - CESifo - 2011
Sick workers in many countries receive sick pay during their illness-related absences from the workplace. In several countries, the social security system insures firms against their workers’ sickness absences. However, this insurance may create moral hazard problems for firms, leading to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320787
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How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country: An Optimal Taxation Problem with Moral Hazard
Cigno, Alessandro - CESifo - 2010
Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596586
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Dynamic Commercial Lobbying
Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J. - CESifo - 2013
This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610089
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How to Share it out: The Value of Information in Teams
Gershkov, Alex; Li, Jianpei; Schweinzer, Paul - CESifo - 2014
the team can be observed. Our central question is whether or not incentives can be provided to a team in this environment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010812489