Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 162
Cover Image
Fishing for Excuses and Performance Evaluation
Larmande, François; Ponssard, Jean-Pierre - CESifo - 2014
We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a convincing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877776
Cover Image
Contractual and Organizational Structurewith Reciprocal Agents
Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen G. - CESifo - 2008
Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal … motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that … sources of incentives to best induce effort from the agent. Analyzing extended versions of the model allows us to examine how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766075
Cover Image
Communicating Subjective Evaluations
Lang, Matthias - CESifo - 2014
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal’s evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781550
Cover Image
Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model
Malcomson, James - CESifo - 2010
Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572569
Cover Image
Does the John Bates Clark Medal Boost Subsequent Productivity and Citation Success?
Chan, Ho Fai; Frey, Bruno S.; Gallus, Jana; Torgler, Benno - CESifo - 2013
Despite the social importance of awards, they have been largely disregarded by academic research in economics. This paper investigates whether a specific, yet important, award in economics, the John Bates Clark Medal, raises recipients’ subsequent research activity and status compared to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877716
Cover Image
Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - CESifo - 2012
each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877789
Cover Image
The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - CESifo - 2012
tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest … incentive system without changing the incentive system. The results indicate that salience of incentives itself is statistically … and economically important for performance. We find that higher salience of incentives for quantity increases quantity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539149
Cover Image
Managerial Payoff and Gift Exchange in the Field
Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen G. - CESifo - 2012
We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and the effect of the worker’s effort on the manager’s payoff. The results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage gift and the agent’s ability to “repay the gift”. We collect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421689
Cover Image
Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - CESifo - 2004
. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765867
Cover Image
What is an Award Worth? An Econometric Assessment of the Impact of Awards on Employee Performance
Neckermann, Susanne; Cueni, Reto; Frey, Bruno S. - CESifo - 2009
Behavioral economics documents the importance of status and self-image concerns in the workplace, but is largely silent about how to instrumentalize them to induce effort. Awards - widespread in the corporate sector and elsewhere - are motivators that derive their value from such social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979427