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Intergovernmental Grants and Bureaucratic Power
Dahlberg, Matz; Nilsson, Heléne Lundqvist; Mörk, Eva - CESifo - 2008
In their role as agenda setters and implementers of political decisions, bureaucrats potentially have the power to influence decisions in their own favor. It is however difficult to empirically test whether bureaucrats actually are involved in such actions. In this paper we suggest and apply a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406110
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Are Public Sector Workers Different? Cross-European Evidence from Elderly Workers and Retirees
Tonin, Mirco; Vlassopoulos, Michael - CESifo - 2015
We investigate whether public and private sector employees differ in terms of public service motivation using a representative sample of elderly workers from 12 European countries. We find that public sector workers, both those currently employed and those already retired, are significantly more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011120473
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Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - CESifo - 2008
The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy’s best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial and non-managerial positions in the public and private sector,using a model of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406416
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Time Consistency and Bureaucratic Budget Competition
Kessing, Sebastian; Konrad, Kai A. - CESifo - 2006
High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions’ output employ excess labor, since this induces the sponsor to provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181370
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The Interrelationship between Formal and Informal Delcentralization and its Impact on Sub-Central Governance Performance: The Case of Vietnam
Vu, Thanh Thuy; Zouikri, Messaoud; Deffains, Bruno - CESifo - 2012
Formal and informal institutions are often viewed as complements or substitutes in empirical and theoretical works. However, no evidence of complementarities or substitutes is found in our empirical analysis of the interrelation between formal and informal decentralization across 64 provinces of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645635
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Pay for Politicians and Candidate Selection: An Empirical Analysis
Kotakorpi, Kaisa; Poutvaara, Panu - CESifo - 2010
A growing theoretical literature on the effect of politicians’ salaries on the average level of skills of political candidates yields ambiguous predictions. In this paper, we estimate the effect of pay for politicians on the level of education of parliamentary candidates. We take advantage of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572515
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A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups
Brandauer, Stefan; Englmaier, Florian - CESifo - 2006
We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406314
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Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bureaucracy
Dodlova, Marina - CESifo - 2013
In a country with weak institutional constraints on the executive, the real power might belong to the government bureaucracy rather than to an autocratic leader. We combine the Aghion-Tirole definition of formal and real authority with the Barro-Ferejohn model of political agency to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010703422
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Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator
Aaken, Anne van; Feld, Lars P.; Voigt, Stefan - CESifo - 2008
hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was … show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181534
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Resource Rents, Democracy and Corruption: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa
Arezki, Rabah; Gylfason, Thorvaldur - CESifo - 2011
We examine the effect of the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption for a panel of 29 Sub …-Saharan countries during the period from 1985 to 2007. We find that higher resource rents lead to more corruption and that the effect is … suggest that the mechanisms through which resource rents affect corruption cannot be separated from political systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294093