Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational …

We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS …

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger …-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent …

A worker’s utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer’s income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker’s effort is fully …

This paper reviews the relatively small literature on sabotage in contests. It looks at both the formal game …

the public good is provided exogenously or dependent on actual tax revenue. We show that neither pure fundraising contests …

We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and … payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive …

We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players …