his employer. This paper uses a principal-agent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker’s effort is fully … awarded stock options, why incentive pay is usually lower in non-profit organizations, and higher in larger firms. Envy may …

We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and the effect of the worker …

worker to “repay the gift” to the employer. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a real effort laboratory experiment where we …

candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment …

We present results from a field experiment designed to measure the importance of managerial commitment to a contract … as a function of the difficulty of the terrain to be planted. During the experiment, workers began planting a terrain at …

We conduct a field experiment in a naturally occurring labor environment and track whether the performance of workers …

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To …