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Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus - CESifo - 2015
post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210403
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Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance
Morath, Florian - CESifo - 2011
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021240
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Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - CESifo - 2012
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010599726
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Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735190
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Innovation Contests
Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - CESifo - 2014
We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877748
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Reserve Price Formation in Online Auctions
Englmaier, Florian; Schmöller, Arno - CESifo - 2008
We use a unique hand collected data set of 6 258 auctions from the online football manager game Hattrick to study micro …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766032
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Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values
Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724
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Does Laboratory Trading Mirror Behavior in Real World Markets? Fair Bargaining and Competitive Bidding on EBay
Bolton, Gary E.; Ockenfels, Axel - CESifo - 2008
We conducted a controlled field experiment on eBay and examined to what extent both social and competitive laboratory behavior is robust to institutionally complex real world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. EBay’s natural trading system provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181559
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A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction
Perry, Motty; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.; Zamir, Shmuel - CESifo - 2000
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405744
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Competitive Rational Expectations Equilibria without Apology
Kovalenkov, Alexander; Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2008
In a standard financial market model with asymmetric information with a finite number N of risk-averse informed traders, competitive rational expectations equilibria provide a good approximation to strategic equilibria as long as N is not too small: equilibrium prices in eachsituation converge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405996