Showing 1 - 10 of 248
The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank’s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765650
Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Thereby,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181562
renegotiation. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially … efficient good ex post. It can be optimal for the buyer, however, to expect that renegotiation does not take place. In this case …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752163
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598911
By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009274519
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210403
When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so-called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249563
This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010639425
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533994
We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price-quantity schedules in an Aghion-Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes depending on whether and how the price of the incumbent good is linked to the quantity purchased from the rival...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795341