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reduce the effort costs of a worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives. We … distinguish two cases. First, the firm owner chooses the intensity of motivation and bears the motivational costs. Second, another … agent of the firm chooses the motivational actions and incurs the associated costs. In the latter case, the firm must not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877648
We present results from a field experiment designed to measure the importance of managerial commitment to a contract within a firm that pays its workers piece rates. In the tree planting industry the piece rate paid to workers is determined as a function of the difficulty of the terrain to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877743
We conduct a field experiment in a naturally occurring labor environment and track whether the performance of workers responds to unexpected wage increases. Specifically, we investigate how the timing of wage increases affects efforts. We find that workers’ performance is about 11% higher for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877759
each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877789
We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and the effect of the worker’s effort on the manager’s payoff. The results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage gift and the agent’s ability to “repay the gift”. We collect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421689
We conduct a field experiment in a controlled work environment to investigate the effect of motivational talk and its interaction with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk significantly improves performance only if it is accompanied by performance pay. Moreover, performance pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693463
A worker’s utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer’s income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principal-agent model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765867
Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766075
An important aspect in determining the effectiveness of gift exchange relations in labor markets is the ability of the worker to “repay the gift” to the employer. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a real effort laboratory experiment where we vary the wage and the effect of the worker’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533996
Behavioral economics documents the importance of status and self-image concerns in the workplace, but is largely silent about how to instrumentalize them to induce effort. Awards - widespread in the corporate sector and elsewhere - are motivators that derive their value from such social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979427