In this paper, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent’s incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in … output; when she monitors the agent’s effort choice; and when she monitors the agent’s corruptibility. I find that monitoring … of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of …

coefficients. Our paper contributes to the (small) literature on experimental tests of (anti-)corruption measures and adds evidence …

might play a role. My paper provides a testbed for experimental testing of anti-corruption measures and adds evidence to the …

one can assign costly punishment points to other group members in order to reduce their payoffs. We compare the effect of … this voluntary punishment possibility with the effect of ex post costless communication: in contrast to the punishment …

The ‘equal punishment for the same crime’ principle is generally agreed upon—yet its implementation differs radically … depending on whether the punishment is measured purely in nominal terms or the subjective perspective of the punishee is … accounted for. This is simply because different people may experience the same punishment with differing intensity. Legal …

games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high …

is consistent with manipulations being driven by corruption of procurement officials. Manipulations concern 8.6% of all …

This paper discusses the issue of perceptions and their influence on economic processes focusing on corruption … perception. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization is, the more probable it is that a person dealing with that … organization would offer a bribe, thus supporting corruption. Since corruption perceptions are rarely based on actual experience …