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Comparing Certification and Self-regulation

Myslivecek, Jan - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2008

I compare certification and self-regulation, two widely used quality assurance mechanisms in markets where consumers do not observe the quality of goods. Certification is a mechanism in which an external firm oers a certificate to producers who undergo a testing procedure, issues the certificate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178146

Productivity Gains from Services Liberalization in Europe

Bena, Jan; Ondko, Peter; Vourvachaki, Evangelia - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2011

As part of the Single Market Program the European Commission commanded the liberalization and regulatory harmonization … productivity of European network firms. Exploiting the variation in the timing and degree of liberalization efforts across … countries and industries, we find that liberalization increased firm-level productivity but had no reallocation impact. Based on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391913

Understanding the Lack of Competition in Natural Gas Markets: The Impact of Storage Ownership and Upstream Competition

Mravec, Michal - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2007

liberalization on a country characterized by a lack of domestic production, limited foreign upstream competition, and highly … upstream producer may practice his market power to capture some of the benefits of liberalization and increase the wholesale …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086605

Fair Trade - Is It Really Fair?

Konecny, Tomas; Myslivecek, Jan - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2008

One of the arguments against the Fair Trade scheme is that the guaranteed minimum price tends to depress world prices and thus the incomes of non-participating farmers (e.g. The Economist, 2006). We develop a model that distinguishes between the impact of the introduction of a Fair Trade market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086614

How to Price Imperfect Certification

Myslivecek, Jan - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2008

This paper analyzes markets in which consumers do not directly observe the quality of the products but form their expectations about the quality based on the outcome of voluntary imperfect certification. I analyze how the certification fee impacts the decisions of the producers to apply for a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086640

Analysis of Electricity Industry Liberalization in Great Britain: How Did the Bidding Behavior of Electricity Producers Change?

Tashpulatov, Sherzod N. - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2010

liberalization process and could be also of interest to countries that created their wholesale electricity markets similar to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642457

Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids

Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2015

We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner's curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The eect of the winner's curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller's expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261195

On the Optimality of Not Allocating

Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2014

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842901

Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions

Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2013

We show that open ascending auctions are prone to inecient rushes, i.e. all bidders quitting at the same price, in … market environments such as privatizations, takeover contests, and procurement auctions. Rushes arise when an incumbent with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842918

Hiding Information in Open Auctions

Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2012

We analyze the rationale for hiding information in open auction formats. In particular, we focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information that could be gathered...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842922