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Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2015

We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner's curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The eect of the winner's curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller's expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261195

On the Optimality of Not Allocating

Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2014

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842901

Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions

Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2013

We show that open ascending auctions are prone to inecient rushes, i.e. all bidders quitting at the same price, in … market environments such as privatizations, takeover contests, and procurement auctions. Rushes arise when an incumbent with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842918

Hiding Information in Open Auctions

Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2012

We analyze the rationale for hiding information in open auction formats. In particular, we focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information that could be gathered...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842922

Learning by Bidding: Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Experiment

Hanousek, Jan; Kocenda, Evzen - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2005

Learning is a subject of intense research in experimental economics. We contribute to this debate by presenting persuasive evidence that learning took place among uninformed heterogeneous agents on a quasi-stock market during a large-scale natural experiment that by size, incentives, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146552

Does Anticipated Regret Really Matter? Revisiting the Role of Feedback in Auction Bidding

Katuscak, Peter; Michelucci, Fabio; Zajicek, Miroslav - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2013

Does the type of post-auction feedback affect bidding behavior in first price auctions? Filiz- Ozbay and Ozbay (2007 … its manipulability by feedback in one-shot auctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842925

Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man?

Chen, Yan; Katuscak, Peter; Ozdenoren, Emre - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2005

We find robust gender differences in bidding behavior in sealed bid auctions with independent and private valuations in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178142

Sealed Bid Auctions with Ambiguity: An Experimental Study

Chen, Yan; Katuscak, Peter; Ozdenoren, Emre - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2005

This study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private … values, where the distribution of bidder valuations is unknown. In our experimental setting, in first price auctions, bids … auctions. It also significantly reduces bidder earnings and efficiency. Without knowledge of the distribution of bidder …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146564

Influential Opinion Leaders

Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2012

We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased toward the experts' interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842926

Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation

Cho, Junghun - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2008

I examine two-period sequential cheap talk in situations where the decision maker seeks advice from two advisors, each of whom knows the type of the other advisor. By considering the current payoff (which is determined by the message of each advisor) and the future payoff (which is connected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357499