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Single and Multi-Dimensional Optimal Auctions - A Network Approach

Malakhov, Alexey; Vohra, Rakesh V. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2004

This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824436

Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria

Eso, Peter; Schummer, James - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2005

In Sender-Receiver games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambiguously" interpreted by the Receiver as coming from a unique set of possible Sender-types. The vulnerability occurs when the types in this set are the ones who gain from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824601

Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders

Pai, Mallesh M.; Vohra, Rakesh - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2008

We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indi- visible good have liquidity constraints, in that they cannot pay more than their `budget' regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We derive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766649

Topologies on Type

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2006

We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens- Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance be- tween a pair of types as the di¤erence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766882

Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation

Schummer, James - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1999

Though some economic environments provide allocation rules that are implementable in dominant strategies (strategy-proof), a significant number of environments yield impossibility results. On the other hand, while there are quite general possibility results regarding implementation in Nash or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588386

Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma

Wiseman, Thomas; Yilankaya, Okan - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1999

In the prisoners' dilemma game, the only evolutionary stable strategy is defection, even though nutual cooperation yields a higher payoff. Building on a paper by Robson (1990), we introduce mutants who have the ability to send a (costly) signal, i.e., the "secret handshake," before each round of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588603

Topologies on Types: Connections

Chen, Yi-Chun; Xiong, Siyang - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2008

For different purposes, economists may use different topologies on types. We char- acterize the relationship among these various topologies. First, we show that for any general types, convergence in the uniform-weak topology implies convergence in both the strategic topology and the uniform...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252482

Information Independence and Common Knowledge

Gossner, Olivier; Kalai, Ehud; Weber, Robert - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2009

In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents’ knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005017524

Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information

Strulovici, Bruno - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2011

How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and … moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of … weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states. When the agent has …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804603

Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1993

Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation … may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the … contract must be a sales contract if the principal's renegotiation position will be inherently inferior in the sense that (a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766727