At arbitrary prices of commodities and assets, fix-price equilibria exist under weak assumptions: endowments need not satisfy an interiority condition, utility functions need only satisfy very weak monotonicity requirement, and the asset return matrix allows for redundant assets. Prices of...

The asset market is incomplete. Fix-price equilibria exist. Price regulation Pareto improves on a competitive allocation.

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals: their elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is...

Individuals exchange contracts for the deliveryof commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directlyor through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash-Walras equilibria...

In an example, monetary policy can determine the information revealed by prices, and thus it can be effective, even desirable.

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash equilibrium profile of strategies information is essentially symemetric when the same profile is also an...

For alternative specifications of an economy under uncertainty, we build a partially revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). At equilibrium, no individual knows the state of the world or the quantities traded by other individuals. The combination of these partial revelation properties...