In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals: their elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the world. At a Nash of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is...

This paper analyses the impact of multiple competitive equilibria and complete markets in a simple general equilibrium model. A random selection from the equilibrium correspondence of a finite exchange economy defines probability distributions on equilibrium prices. Asset markets allow traders...

We reconsider the well-known result of Arrow (1953) that the set of equilibria of an economy with complete markets coincides with the one of an economy with sequentially complete markets. We show by means of two examples that this result is problematic when there exist multiple equilibrium...

For alternative specifications of an economy under uncertainty, we build a partially revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). At equilibrium, no individual knows the state of the world or the quantities traded by other individuals. The combination of these partial revelation properties...