A social state is irreducible if, and only if for any non-trivial partition of individuals with two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible...

At a Nash - Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, NashWalras equilibria exist, equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but Pareto suboptimal, though not constrained...

This paper analyses the formation of trading groups in a bilateral market with strategic traders. A trading structure (a partition of the set of traders into trading groups) is strongly stable if no coalition of traders can deviate and increase the utility of some of its members while making no...

This paper examines the (local) strong rationality properties of the perfect foresight equilibrium in a two period general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with a single asset market linking the two time periods. All individuals know the model of the economy. However, they only know that...

We consider the model of exchange " A la Coumot”, originally proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley and analysed by S. Sahi and S. Y80 (1989), in markets with a continuum of traders. We show that each active Coumot equilibrium is a Wahas equilibrium and each Wahas equilibrium is a Coumot equilibrium