Exchange and Optimality

A social state is irreducible if, and only if for any non-trivial partition of individuals with two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.

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Year of publication:	1994-12-01
Authors:	GHOSAL, Sayantan ; POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	social states \| optimality \| exchange

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 1994072
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008227