In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.

We develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs. In the first stage, the players are forming coalitions and inside each coalition formed the members share the coalition benefits. We adopt the...

Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane, that faces a problem of locating public facilities to be used by its members. The cost of every facility is financed by its users, who also face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We assume that the...

This paper examines a model of multi-jurisdiction formation where individuals' characteristics are uniformly distributed over a finite interval. Every jurisdiction locates a public facility and distributes its cost equally among the residents. We consider two notions of stability: Nash...

In this paper we examine compensation schemes that prevent a threat of secession by all country's regions and in the same time provide no incentives for citizens' migration within the country. We prove that, under quite general assumptions on the distribution of citizens' preferences, there...