This paper constructs an overlapping generations model of pollution externality wherein individ- uals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady-state consumption can be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite...

Noise-induced pollution constitutes a hot and topical societal problem for all major airports. This paper discusses various issues in the implementation of a market for noise licenses as a solution to solve the noise externality between the residents located around airports and the aircrafts...

This paper analyses how the way emission permits are traded -their market microstructure- impacts the optimal policy to be adopted by the environmental agency. The microstructure used is one of a quote driven market type, which characterizes many financial markets: market makers act as...

This paper examines the empirical interplay between economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions using panel data. Relying on nonparametric methods, we find evidence supporting specifications which assume the constancy of the relationship between CO2 emissions and GDP per capita during the...

The paper deals with a cooperative game theory analysis of the economics of international agreements on climate change.

Children of educated parents systematically perform better at school than children of uneducated parents. It is then natural, if the location of families in the city follows a socially stratified pattern, to observe differences in public school's performances even when they are identically financed.

Extrinsic uncertainty is effective at a competitive equilibrium. This is generic if spot markets are inoperative: the only objects of exchange are assets for the contingent delivery of commodities; and the asset market is incomplete. The structure of payoffs of assets may allow for non-trivial...

In this paper we derive the equilibrium level of redistribution from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another possibly mobile factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter-regional transfers and redistributive policies non-cooperatively.