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GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; GVETADZE, Salome; ZANAJ, Skerdilajda - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

This paper examines how and why people migrate between two regions with asymmetric size. The agglomeration force comes from the scale economies in the provision of local public goods, whereas the dispersion force comes from congestion in consumption of public goods. Public goods considered...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927680

Voluntary contributions with uncertainty: the environmental quality.

JOUVET, Pierre-André - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. Each agent concerned by the environmental degradation can voluntarily contribute in order to reduce it. Contributing to the environmental quality means financing depollution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042991

Internal vs. core coalitional stability in the environmental externality game: A reconciliation

Tulkens, Henry - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014

In a game with positive externalities, such as e.g. the standard environmental externality game used in the analysis of international environmental agreements, the solutions having the property of coalitional internal stability, when they exist, are compared in this paper with the solutions with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246306

Anonymous social influence

FÖRSTER, Manuel; GRABISCH, Michel; RUSINOWSKA, Agnieszka - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2013

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010695714

The kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and beyond: an economic and game theoretical exploration and interpretation

CHANDER, Parkash; TULKENS, Henry - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

The paper is not intended for game theorists - unless they are interested in learning how their theories, and the theory of environmental games as developed in a forthcoming book, are being used for studying the current problem of climate change. Similarly for economists. In general, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610463

Economic integration as a partition function game

MORELLI, Massimo; PENELLE, Philippe - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1997

explicitly predict the timing of admission to coalitions, the equilibrium coalition structure and payoff distribution, as well as … the equilibrium length of the admission game. We derive conditions on the availability of side-payments under which a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008385

How does selfishness affect well-being ?

MILCHTAICH, Igal - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

players. It is shown that it is not impossible for the equilibrium payoffs in the modified game to be lower than every … equilibrium payoff in the original game. For example, in a symmetric Cournot duopoly competition, if the two firms move only … selfishness on the symmetric equilibrium payoffs in a symmetric two-person game depends crucially on the stability of these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008674

Cores of games with positive externalities

CHANDER, Parkash - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

class of strategic games, it is a weaker concept than the strong Nash equilibrium, but in general stronger than the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550191

The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

BRECHET, Thierry; EYCKMANS, Johan; GERARD, François; … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042928

Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution.

BARBERA, Salvador; MASCHLER, Michael; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043003