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Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection
DE FEO, Giuseppe; HINDRIKS, Jean - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005
insurance markets can be bad when there is adverse selection. Using the dual theory of choice under risk, we are able to fully … competition is less trivial. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better insurance but at the cost of driving out some agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008696
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Uncertainty and Insurance in Strategic Market Games.
Weyers, S. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996
In perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and a formulation with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over in a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779547
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Does propitious selection explain why riskier people buy less insurance?
DE DONDER, Philippe; HINDRIKS, Jean - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006
Empirical testing of asymmetric information in the insurance market has uncovered a negative correlation between risk … levels and insurance purchases, rather than the positive correlation predicted by the standard insurance theory. Hemenway … insurance buyers have different tastes for risk and that "individuals who are highly risk avoiding are more likely both to try …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008188
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Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market
OLIVELLA, Pau; SCHROYEN, Fred - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011
In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions: their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion. We solve for the profit maximizing menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer puts out on the market. First, we find that it is never optimal to fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610450
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Trials and Errors : PLEA Bargaining as a Learning Device
BORTOLOTTI, Bernardo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996
The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomplete information game. It is shown that, for a given parameter configuration, there exists a Bayesian equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008467
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Trials and Errors: Plea Bargaining as a Learning Device.
Bortolotti, B. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996
The plea bargaining procedure, namely the viability of a stage of bargaining between prosecutor and defendant in criminal suits, is analyzed in the framework of a two-sided incomlete information game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779401
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Optimal enforcement of competition policy : the commitments procedure under uncertainty
GAUTIER, Axel; PETIT, Nicolas - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014
Since the introduction of a formal commitments procedure in EU an- titrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Be- bchuk, 1984; Shavell,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246329
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Licensing to vertically related markets
SCHOLZ, Eva-Maria - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014
We analyse the problem of a non-producing patentee who licenses an essential process innovation to a vertical Cournot oligopoly. The vertical oligopoly is composed of an upstream and a downstream sector which may differ in their efficiency or, in other words, in the benefit they derive from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094060
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Dynamic protection of innovations through patents and trade secrets
BELLELFLAMME, Paul; BLOCH, Francis - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2013
This paper analyzes the optimal protection strategy for an innovator of a complex innovation who faces the risk of imitation by a competitor. We suppose that the innovation can be continuously fragmented into sub-innovations. We characterize the optimal mix of patent and trade secrets when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735621
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Piracy and competition
BELLEFLAMME, Paul; PICARD, Pierre - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005
The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042956