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We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043003
Consider a country with two regions that have developed differently so that their current levels of energy efficiency differ. Each region's production involves the emission of pollutants, on which a regulator might impose restrictions. The restrictions can be related to pollution standards that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043011
Properties of stochastic outcome functions are exploited to solve the moral hazard problem in teams under unobservable individual actions and different individual objectives. Two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: Enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008495
1n two related papers, Kaneko (1977, 1977a) hILS proved an equivalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a specific public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008579
Is selfishness always a bad thing, in the sense that people can only be better off when everyone is concerned with the well-being of others as well as with his own, or are there situations in which altruism can actually make things worse for all people involved ? This paper tackles this question...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008674
We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669286
In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634039
Is selfishness always a bad thing, in the sense that people can only be better off when everyone is concerned with well-being of others as well as with his own, or are there situations in which altruis, can actually make things worse for all people involved? This paper tackles this question in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634090
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550218
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550226