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How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
DEHEZ, Pierre; FEREY, Samuel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012
define a transferable utility game whose core defines fair judgments. We show that weighted Shapley values define fair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610447
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Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey
FORGES, Françoise; MINELLI, Enrico; VOHRA, Rajiv - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001
This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information …. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes … issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core convergence to price equilibrium allocations. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008294
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Ratio equilibria and voting in a public goods economy with jurisdictions
CURRARINI, Sergio - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1996
a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008579
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On efficiency and sustainability in a collective decision-making problem with heterogeneous agents
HAIMANKO, Ori; LE BRETON, Michel; WEBER, Shlomo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2002
In this paper we examine a collective decision problem, where the set of heterogeneous individuals is partitioned into several groups, each choosing its own policy (e.g., location of a public project) from the given policy space. We first consider the notion of "efficient" partition that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008591
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Invariance with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power
de CLIPPEL, Geoffroy - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003
with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power' (IRCP) allows to characterize the core as the largest solution … characterize the inner core for NTU games with convex and smooth feasible sets. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043363
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The [gamma]-core and coalition formation
CHANDER, Parkash - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003
This paper reinterprets by [gamma]-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043417
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The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects
FORGES, Françoise; MERTENS, Jean-François; VOHRA, Rajiv - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001
incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved … exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043580
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Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods
dEHEZ, Pierre - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010
A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642230
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Agenda Control in Coalition Formation.
Bloch, F.; Rottier, S. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478947
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Coalitional Negotiation.
Mauleon, A.; Vannetelbosch, V. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
The authors develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669281