We define a two-variant model of product differentiation which, depending on the number of consumersprefering one variant to the other, provides equilibrium prices reflecting the natural valuation of thesevariants by the market....

We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, orcapacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a “Minimum Quality Standard” in order tohelp the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to...

The imposition of universal coverage and uniform pricing constraints, as part of the universalservice obligations, makes the universal service provider less aggressive in the price game when itcompetes with a firm that does not cover the whole set of markets (Valletti et al., 2002). In...

This paper analyses price competition under product differentiation when goods are defined ina two dimensional characteristic space, and consumers do not know which firm sells whichquality. Equilibrium prices consist of two additive terms, which balance consumers' relativevaluation of goods'...

We analyse firms' incentives to provide two-way compatibility between two network goodswith different intrinsic qualities. We study how the relative importance of verticaldifferentiation with respect to the network effect influences the price competition as well as thecompatibility choice. The...