This paper extends the standard work effort model by allowing workers to interact through networks. We investigate experimentally whether peer performances and peer contextual effects influence individual performances. Two types of network are considered. Participants in Recursive networks are...

We model the emulation between two athletes whose goals are fixed by their coaches. The coaches in turn engage in a game of goal setting. We analyze the equilibriums of that game. For some range of parameter values, there are only mixed equilibriums, where one coach randomizes his goals while...

Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation...

We develop a theoretical model in which each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the satisfaction of...

In this article we evaluate the problems that arise when it comes to the financing of public goods and services. More specifically, we consider the financing of public goods by voluntary contributions. Although economic theory predicts free riding and thus an inefficient provision of the public...

In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects away from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions. Lorsque les sujets...

This text (Keser) is a survey and a discussion of experimental studies on cooperation in public goods experiments. It is followed by a comment (Montmarquette) suggesting some economic applications from these experimental studies. Ce texte (Keser) présente une revue et une discussion des écrits...

We show that the famous neutrality result in the theory of public good contributions (Warr, Kemp, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian) depends crucially on the assumption that agents do not take into account the effect of their public good contribution decisions on the relative price of the private...