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Engle-Warnick, Jim; Hopkins, Ed - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2006

We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101118

Tournadre, Fabienne; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2001

This paper reports on an experimental study of the influence of asymmetric information and information spillovers on bargaining outcomes. It develops and tests Kuhn and Gu (1999) s model of learning in sequential wage negotiations, by means of two Ultimatum Bargaining Games with uncertainty on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169010

Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment

Armantier, Olivier; Boly, Amadou - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2008

This paper makes an attempt at testing the external validity of corruption experiments by moving from the lab in a … developed country, to where it matters the most, the field in a developing country. In our experiment a candidate proposes a … environments the probability to accept the bribe. Finally, we identify several micro-determinants of corruption (age, religiousness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100538

Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence

Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011

be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833344

Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments

Keser, Claudia - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2000

Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100527

Voluntary Contributions to Reduce Expected Public Losses

Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

In this experimental study we examine behavior relating to voluntary contributions to reduce expected losses associated, for example, with the occurrence of natural disasters or major industrial accidents. We ask subjects to allocate tokens between a private investment and a public investment....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100545

Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

Fortin, Bernard; Lacroix, Guy; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100598

Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?

Coricelli, Giorgio; Joffily, Mateus; Montmarquette, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2007

experiment shows that emotional arousal, measured by Skin Conductance Responses, increases in the proportion of evaded taxes. The … perspective of punishment after an audit, especially when the pictures of the evaders are publicly displayed, also raises emotions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100604

Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities

Armantier, Olivier; Treich, Nicolas - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2006

We conduct an experiment to test whether probability misperception may be a possible alternative to risk aversion to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100674

Who Gets the Last Word? An Experimental Study of the Effect of a Peer Review Process on the Expression of Social Norms

Engle-Warnick, Jim; Leibbrandt, Andreas - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2006

We alter who gets the last word on the outcome in three different types of trust games: the first mover, the second mover, or, a committee comprised of first and second movers. The committee functions in a manner similar to a peer review process, in which experienced subjects pass judgment on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100807