Showing 1 - 10 of 30
as follows : i) ‘workforce or union opposition’ interacted with ‘regulatory constraints’ has a negative significant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010711876
We provide an equilibrium analysis of a wage bargaining model between a union and a firm in which the union must choose … bargaining have constant discount factors, in our model preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of … supremum of the union's payoffs and the infimum of the firm's payoffs under subgame perfect equilibrium in all periods when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743292
We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences … union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement. We show that there exist inefficient subgame perfect … equilibria in the model where the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. Furthermore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098347
We investigate a wage bargaining between the union and the firm where the parties' preferences are expressed by varying … discount rates and the threat of the union is to be on go-slow instead of striking. First, we describe the attitude of the … union as hostile or altruuistic where a hostile union is on go-slow in every disagreement period and an altruistic union …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098351
In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a … cases when the strike decision of the union is exogenous : the case when the union is supposed to go on strike in each … period in which there is a disagreement, the case when the union is committed to go on strike only when its own offer is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649761
We determine the optimal policy to cope with information concealment in a hierarchy where a principal relies on a supervisor to obtain verifiable information about an agent's output. Depending on the information he has obtained, the informed supervisor may either collude with the agent or with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598290
To control, evaluate, and motivate their agents, firms employ supervisors. As shown by empirical investigations, biased evaluation by supervisors linked to collusion is a persistent feature of firms. This paper studies how deceptive supervision affects agency relationships. We consider a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010596145
This paper offers new insights into the processes of firm growth by applying a reduced form vector autoregression (VAR) model to longitudinal panel data on French manufacturing firms (1996-2004). We observe the co-evolution of key variables such as growth of employment, sales, and gross...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005797751
This paper offers many new insights into the processes of firm growth by applying a vector autoregression (VAR) model to longitudinal panel data on French manufacturing firms. We observe the co-evolution of key variables such as growth of employment, sales, gross operating surplus and labour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670852
This paper aims to test the intrinsic motivation of licensed in-home services (LIHS) employees with an emphasis on the differences in hourly wages paid to the employees of non-profit LIHS and for-profit LIHS employees. Our approach is to test intrinsic motivation by using the “labor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010791267