We study the consequences of dropping the perfect competition assumption in an infinite horizon model with infinitely-lived traders and collateralized assets together with asymmetric information among players and incomplete monitoring. Trading assets is not only a way to hedge oneself against...

This paper studies experimentally the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions with asymmetric information. We implement in the laboratory three examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. The stage...

We study the consequences of dropping the perfect competition assumption in a standard infinite horizon model with infinitely-lived traders and real collateralized assets, together with one additional ingredient : information among players is asymmetric and monitoring is incomplete. The key...

We consider situations in which individuals would like to choose an action which is close to that of others, as well as close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, a cheap-talk communication stage is offered to...