Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Cover Image
Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
This note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann- Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do … so, we study Markov perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games … suciently farsighted; thus establishing a relationship between vN-M stability and strategic stability in voting games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652415
Cover Image
The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach
Montero, Maria - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552237
Cover Image
Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games
Montero, Maria - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2008
This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552275
Cover Image
Information Aggregation in Spatial Committee Games
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee members must agree on a decision rule to aggregate their private information on a policy-relevant state of the world. We derive sufficient conditions for the ex ante incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884978
Cover Image
A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010
This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games … bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 182-201]. The exploration of a specific class of Markov … perfect equilibria in these "dynamic tournament games" yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments - the A-stable set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781905
Cover Image
A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010
This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games … bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 182-201]. The exploration of a specific class of Markov … perfect equilibria in these "dynamic tournament games" yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments - the A-stable set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568152
Cover Image
Proportional Payoffs in Majority Games
Montero, Maria - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2008
This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453711
Cover Image
Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
This note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann- Morgenstern (vN-M) stable sets in voting games. To do … so, we study Markov perfect equilibria of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game, based on underlying simple games … suciently farsighted; thus establishing a relationship between vN-M stability and strategic stability in voting games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150911
Cover Image
Information Aggregation in Spatial Committee Games
Anesi, Vincent - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee members must agree on a decision rule to aggregate their private information on a policy-relevant state of the world. We derive sucient conditions for the ex ante incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200583
Cover Image
The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach
Montero, Maria - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200587