Showing 1 - 10 of 46
History has seen many examples of the lone man ñ like Christ, Luther, Gandhi, or Hitler -- who without initial wealth or position, succeeds in changing the behavior of an entire society, for good or for ill. Whence comes this power. No doubt such leaders have possessed extraordinary ability,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463938
hull of the point set. We also indicate the effect of individual rationality considerations on our results. As most of our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463998
The appearance of a Brownian term in the price dynamics on a stock market was interpreted in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003)] as a consequence of the informational asymmetries between agents. To take benefit of their private information without revealing it to fast, the informed agents have to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463901
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123506
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895645
We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called beta-delta) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and then use this set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087408
It seems reasonable to suppose that in repeated games in which communications is possible, play is determined through a process of negotiation and renegotiation as events unfold. In the absence of a satisfying theory of players' bargaining power, it is unclear how to model this process....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593208
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593265
This paper uses data on nearly a million homes sold in four metropolitan areas -- Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas and San Francisco -- to construct quarterly indexes of existing home prices between 1970 and 1986. We propose and apply a new method of constructing such indexes which we call the method of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593356
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593480