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Dubey, Pradeep; Garg, Rahul - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

We consider a communications network in which users transmit beneficial information to each other at a cost. We pinpoint conditions under which the induced cooperative game is supermodular (convex). Our analysis is in a lattice-theoretic framework, which is at once simple and able to encompass a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593347

A Refined Bargaining Set of an n-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation

Zhou, Lin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1991

The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? No previous solution concepts or theories in the literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593467

Matching with Incomplete Information

Liu, Quingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

assumes that the agents have complete information, and examines core outcomes. We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686932

The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762670

The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762688

A Computational Analysis of the Core of a Trading Economy with Three Competitive Equilibria and a Finite Number of Traders

Shubik, Martin; Kumar, Alok - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

In this paper we examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number … of traders (N) is varied. We also examine the sensitivity of the multiplicity of equilibria and of the core to variations … in individual initial endowments. Computational results show that the core first splits into two pieces at N = 5 and then …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593218

The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores of an Economy

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The … possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464037

Fairness through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach

Clippel, Geoffroy de; Rozen, Kareen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

This paper experimentally investigates cooperative game theory from a normative perspective. Subjects designated as Decision Makers express their view on what is fair for others, by recommending a payoff allocation for three subjects (Recipients) whose substitutabilities and complementarities...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895694

Absenteeism, Substitutes, and Complements and the Banzhaf Index

Quint, Thomas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

We consider the voting-with-absenteeism game of Quint-Shubik (2003). In that paper we defined a power index for such games, called the absentee index. Our analysis was based on the theory of the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI) for simple games. In this paper we do an analogous analysis, based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762592

On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming

Quint, Thomas; Wake, Jun - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multivalued. We define a condition on such … core allocation in the model with no indifference). We prove that a game has a nonempty strict core if and only if it is … a strict core allocation or a report that the strict core is empty. Finally, we are also able to construct a linear …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762743