Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762684
equilibrium, allowing analysis of a number of economic models of coordination failure. For symmetric binary action global games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762807
Common knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762856
macroeconomic coordination failures. We first analyze an abstract game and find that inefficient equilibria and a multiplier process …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593323
setting where agents take actions appropriate to the underlying fundamentals, but they also have a coordination motive arising …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593366
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593480
The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990808
interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093925
The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093939
emphasis on speculation, betting, agreeing to disagree, and coordination. The implications of approximate common knowledge are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634734