In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes …

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the … strictly convex norm, common to all agents. A voting scheme is strategy-proof, if voting for one's best point is an optimal …

every jurisdiction?s voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting …

We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alter- natives. We interpret sincerity as opposed … to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behaviour when conditions to vote strategically vanish …. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type we show that this op- timal behaviour coincides with an intuitive …

We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to … strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish. When voting … mechanisms allow for only one message type (simple voting mechanisms) we show that eliminating some conditions for strategic …